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ABSTRACT
A Failure Modes and Effects Analysis workstation
(FMEAssist) has been designed for use during develop-
ment of the Space Station. It assists engineers in the
complex task of tracking failures and their effects on
the system. Engineers experience increased produc-
tivity through reduced clerical loads, reduced data
inconsistency, and significantly reduced analysis time.
System developments benefit from a more thorough
analysis than was available using previous methods.
The wide variety of design information required to
support the FMEA process is modeled b[ FMEAssist in a
network of different discipline and deslgn data views
generated by a data base to knowledge base translation
tool. System designs are displayed _raphicall[ allowing
engineers to manipulate informatlon or to induce and
record failure on appropriate parts within the network.
Propagation of functional effects for each node can be
controlled from one or more nodes within the design to
any desired level or until special conditions are
encountered.
!. INTRODUCTION
Space Station design information is modeled by FMEAssist in
a network of nodes (representing components) connected by arcs
(representing relationships between the various parts of the
design). The wide variety of information required to support the
FMEA process is acquired from a view across several heterogeneous
discipline and design data base tables and are mapped into a net-
work structure through Foundation, a data base to knowledge base
translation tool[4]. System designs are displayed graphically
allowing engineers to analyze design information and to induce
failure on appropriate parts within the network.
The architecture of this system is built upon a hierarchi-
cally decomposed functional model that determines "failure"
through abnormal component behavior. This representation permits
a more detailed description of "failure modes" beyond those typi-
cally pre-defined through either design or system engineerlng.
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These functional failures are composed of component constraint
violations. Propagation of functional effects is controlled from
one or more 9odes within the desig 9 to an_ desired level or until
speclal condltlons, such as a critical failure, are encountered.
2. APPLICATION
Previous work on FMEA automation used a frame-based approach
where frames and slots contain pre-defined failure modes and
first order effects. While this approach offered powerful
descriptive capabilities, first-order analyses were performed
manually and entered into the model. Since assertional capabili-
ties were not provided, functional information was not modeled.
Failures were propagated through pre-programmed frame connections
using messages contained in failure mode slots.[3]
Alternately, a number of fault analysis systems have been
developed using assertional models, that is, a rule-based func-
tional approach. While assertional models provide an excellent
medium for describing functional behavior, they do not provide
the representational convenience of the structural model. Ongo-
ing work has pursued a useful mixture of structural and functlon
models. J1,6]
The FMEAssist approach integrates some of this work on the
coupling of structural and assertional components b[ combining
the connective strength of flavors with the expresslveness of
logic. A failure mode is defined as the effect a group of abnor-
mal properties has on a component. If the status of the com-
ponent, due to the its properties, is "failed" or "abnormal",
then these properties (and not the fact that the component has
malfunctioned) are propagated to connected or neighboring com-
ponents. J2,5]
Abnormal properties are grouped into failure modes at the
component level, but only to promote analysis within the failed
component. The knowledge of the mode or even the failure itself
is not distributed to the connected or surrounding nodes, but it
is the connection and environmental properties that carry a
component's fate to neighboring components. That is, a malfunc-
tioning component has no knowledge of how it affects other parts.
If the malfunction changes any of its outputs, those values
change for the connected component input ports. Input properties
for components are the output results from prevlous inference
upon abnormal properties. If these new properties constitute
failure or can be classed in a failure mode, they are so
recorded, but inference on component properties, normal or other-
wise, continues.
"Effects analysis" becomes a deductive process, reasoning
from the properties contained in a highly structured part
model[5]. The need for pre-programmed propagation responses is
replaced with a more refined description of an assembly or
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component. This type of descriptive and behavioral information
is readil[ available and can be captured during the design and
system englneering process.
3. EXAMPLES
The examples in this section are designed to promote under-
standing of the descriptive structures and behaviors found within
FMEAssist. Figure-i illustrates how components are defined and
described. The defcomponent macro in this example serves to
create a component type PUMP-A which inherits characteristics
(descriptive and behavioral) from another type called PUMP. The
defport and defproperty macros are used to deflne port/port types
and property/property values for a component type.
Some behavioral characteristics of a component type remain
constant regardless of how and where instances of it are used in
the system. These "generic" behavioral characteristics are
shared by all instances of the component type. Examples of gen-
eric behavioral descriptions can be found in Flgure-2 and
Figure-3. Other characteristics however, might change depending
on the operating conditions of the instance component. These
behavioral characteristics are determined at the particular
instance level.
While workin_ with the FMEAssist application on a Foundation
Workstation, englneers are able to graphically display networks
from various perspective relations, such as subcomponent,
failure, and connection spannin@ tree.. Inference mechanisms _ro-
vide the basis for the applicatlon's sln_le, multiple-sequentlal,
and multlple-parallel fallure propagatlon. FMEAssist also pro-
vides graphical justlfication or narratlve explanatlon for any
inference produced during the failure _ropagation. Finally,
various reports are generated on the analytlcal results from each
engineering session.
; define some generic component descriptions
(defcomponent PUMP-A (generic-type 'PUMP))
(defcomponent VALVE-C (generic-type 'VALVE))
; define input and output for generic component descriptions
(defport PUMP-A ((port-i 'thermal) (port-2 'electrical)))
(defport VALVE-C ((port-1 'thermal) (port-2 'electrical)))
; define properties for port connections
(defproperty THERMAL
(temperature (nominal high low))
(pressure (nominal high low))
(medium (air co2 water)))
FIGURE i: Examples of descriptive definitions
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; define some rules about components
(defrule PUMP-SHUTDOWN
(IF [AND [PUMP-PRESSURE-STATUS =some-pump 'LOW]
[PUMP-TEMPERATURE-STATUS =some-pump 'LOW]]
THEN (tell [PUMP-STATUS =some-pump 'ABNORMAL])))
(defrule PROPAGATE-PRESSURE-STATUS
(IF [PUMP-PRESSURE-STATUS =some-pump 'LOW]
THEN (tell [PUMP-PRESSURE-OUTPUT =some-pump
=some-port 'LOW])
(tell [(connected-to =some-pump =some-port) 'LOW])))
(defrule PROPAGATE-TEMPERATURE-STATUS
(IF [PUMP-TEMPERATURE-STATUS =some-pump 'LOW]
THEN (tell [PUMP-TEMPERATURE-OUTPUT =some-pump
=some-port 'LOW])
(tell [(connected-to =some-pump =some-port) 'LOW])))
; create some part instances
(make-component PUMP-99 (component-type 'PUMP-A))
(make-component VALVE-46 (component-type 'VALVE-C))
(make-connection '(PUMP-99 VALVE-46)
'((port-i port-l) (port-2 port-2)))
FIGURE 2: Examples of specific assertive definitions
;Output behavior rule
(defrule LEAKY-THINGS-CONTAMINATE-SURROUNDINGS
(IF [AND [LEAKS =something]
[> (PRESSURE =something)
(PRESSURE (contained-in =something
=something-else))]
THEN (tell [CONTAMINATES (medium =something)
=something-else])))
;Input behavior rule
(defrule CONTAMINATED-ELECTRONIC-COMPONENTS-MIGHT-SHORT
(IF [AND [CONTAMINATES =medium =area]
[CONTAINED-IN =component =area]
[CONDUCTOR =medium]
[ELECTRICAL-COMPONENT =component]]
THEN (tell [HAS-SHORTS =component])))
FIGURE 3: Examples of generic assertive definitions
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4. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
Engineers will experience increased productivity through
reduced clerical loads, reduced data inconsistency, and signifi-
cantly reduced analysis time with the added benefit of a more
thorough analysis than was available using previous methods•
FMEAssist is easy to use, produces FMEA and Critical Items List
(CIL) reports, and keeps records of critical failures, as well as
sequences of events leading to failures.
In the future, tools like FMEAssist will make it possible
for initial failure analyses to be performed early during the
system design phases• These tools will be able to identify sig-
nificant failure modes for single and multiple-point failures.
This will free engineers from the tedious task of enumerating the
simple single failure mode groupings and to provide an extended
capability of correlating complex fallure modes with groups of
components.
•
•
•
•
.
•
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